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pose of 1949 amendments of Lab. 
correct statutory inequity which 
et al., Petitioners, v. 
COMMISSION and 
ment for attorney's fees in prosecution of injured 
employee's independent action against third person, although 
full amount of in favor of under converse 
circumstances, might be allowed as a credit against compensa-
tion. 
[2] !d.-Actions Against Third Lien Against 
Judgment-Attorney's Pees.-:N o provrswn is made in Lab. 
Code, §§ 3856, 3861, for reimbursement to either employer or 
injured employee for his legal expense when a third party's 
liability has been settled by either of them; a judicial proceed-
ing is contemplated before any deduction may be allowed for 
such expense. 
[3] !d.-Actions Against Third Persons--Amount of Settlement 
Subject to Employer's Claim.-Lah. Code, § 3860, relating to 
settlements of rights of action third persons before 
judgment or without suit, is by 1949 amendments 
of Lab. Code, 3856, 3861; such amendments show no legis-
lative intent to alter reimbursement relating to 
settlement, and entire amount of such settlement continues to 
be subject to employer's elaim for reimbursement for his com-
pensation expenditures and liability. 
[4] Id.- Actions Against Third Persons- Notice of Suit: At-
torney's Pees.-There is a clear distinction between a suit to 
enforce injured employee's cause of action against a third 
person, and a settlement which is made by employee; if em-
ployee commences action he must give to other party written 
notice of action (Lab. Code, ~ 3853) and the parties may make 
arrangements for payment of attorney's fees, or if they do not 
do so a reasonable attorney's fee for each may be fixed by 
court (Lab. Qode, ~ 3856), but the Legislature has made no 
provision for either notice to the other party when a settle-
ment is contemplated or for determination of amount of an 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 17; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 366. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Workmen's Compensation, § 35 1 
[4] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 26, 33. 
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attorney's fee when it is effected, and to extend provisions for 
recoupment of attorney's fees beyond their application to a 
judicial action would be to do so without the safeg·uards 
applicable to them. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission allowing a credit against an award of com-
pensation for personal injuries. Award affirmed in part and 
annulled in part with directions. 
Kearney, Scott & Clopton for Petitioners. 
Everett A. Corten and Gordon W. Winbigler for He-
spondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The Industrial Accident Commission cred-
ited against an award of compensation only $1,400 of the 
amount received by Augustus Chiarello in settlement of his 
elaim against an asserted third party tort feasor. His em-
ployer and its insurance carrier contend that they are entitled 
to the entire amount obtained by the settlement without 
deduction of attorney's fees. 
Chiarello was employed by R E. Spriggs, Inc. He claimed 
to have sustained injuries while he was delivering merchan-
dise to the Panorama Market. \Vithout filing suit or notify-
ing either his employer or its insurer, he made a settlement 
with Panorama for $2,100 and executed a full release of all 
claims against it. 
In the proceeding before the commission, after allowing 
a credit of $2,100, on its own motion the commission reopened 
the matter for rt>consideration. By the new decision, the 
commission credited againsV the compensation award only 
$1,400, "being the amount recovered by the appli(•ant ... 
after payment of attorney's fee of $700.00, which sum is 
found to constitute a reasonable attorney's fee for services 
rendered in effecting recovery for the benefit of the em-
ployer.'' 
As grounds for annulling the award, the employer asserts 
that there is no statutory authority for the commission to 
withhold from a credit against an award of compensation the 
attorney's fees paid by an employee to effect a settlement. 
But even if that contention is incorrect, the argument con-
tinues, attorney's fees should be allowed only when fixed 
by a court or by an agreement between the employee's attor-
ney and the employer or its insurer. Another contention is 
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that in the present case there is no evidentiary support for 
a finding either that Chiarello paid out $700 for an attorney's 
fee, or that such a fee is a reasonable one for the services 
rendered. 
It is agreed by all of the parties that the decisive question 
in this proceeding is the effect of certain amendments to the 
Labor Code, made in 1949. (Stats. 1949, ch. 120, pp. 355-356.) 
Prior to the amendments, the provisions of that code were 
construed in Dodds v. Stellar, 30 Cal.2d 496 (183 P.2d 658]. 
It was concluded that three remedies are available to an 
employer to recover, from a negligent third party, the ex-
penses of compensation to which an injured employee is 
entitled. The employer may bring an independent suit 
against the third party (Lab. Code, § 3852) or he may consoli-
date his action with, or join with the employee in, an action 
against the third party (Lab. Code, § 3853). If he has 
pursued neither of these remedies, he may claim in the em-
ployee's action a first lien in the amount of his expenditures 
for compensation ''against the entire amount of any judgment 
for damages recovered by the employee." (Lab. Code, 
§ 3856.) 
In the Dodds case, the employee sued the third party and 
joined the employer and its insurer as defendants. The 
employer sought as a lien against the judgment in that action 
an amount equal to its costs of compensating the employee. 
Upon appeal, the employee contended that the trial court 
should have deducted from the amount payable by the judg-
ment to the employer in satisfaction of its lien, the attorney's 
fees paid by the injured workman in prosecuting the action. 
This contention was rejected. It was pointed out that the 
statutory provisions relating to an employer's right of reim-
bursement define the rights of the parties and completely 
cover the field. 
Although, under the statutes then in effect, provision was 
made for reimbursing an employer for its attorney's fees 
expended when prosecuting an action alone (Lab. Code, 
§ 3854), there was no similar provision for compensating an 
employee when he sued in an action which benefited the 
employer. Both in cases where recovery was obtained as 
the result of a suit against the tort feasor (Lab. Code, § 3856) 
and where a settlement was effected (Lab. Code, § 3860) the 
"entire amount" of such judgment or settlement was subject 
to the employer's full claim for reimbursement for his com-
788 
Similar provisions were 
stated in section which deals with a proceeding before 
the commission instituted after a or settlement has 
been obtained. 
The 1949 amendments eonsist of to sections 3854, 
3856, and the addition of section 3863. Only those 
amendments and 3861 are pertinent 
to the with the 
amended reads: 
Section 3861 : '' 'fhe commission is to and shall 
allow, as a credit to the employer to be applied against his 
liability for compensation, such amount of any recovery by 
the employee for his either settlement or after 
judgment, as has not theretofore been applied to reimburse 
the employer, or has not been applied to the payment of an 
attorney's fee to the employee's attorney, pursuant to the 
provisions of section 3856 of this code." 
Section 3856 : ''The court shall first out of the 
entire amount of any judgment for any damage recovered 
by the employee, a sufficient amount to reimburse the em-
ployer for the amount of his expenditures for compensation. 
If the employer has not joined in the action or has not brought 
action, or if his action has not been consolidated, the court, 
on his application shall allow, as a first lien against the entire 
amount of any judgment for any damages recovered by the 
employee, the amount of the employer's expenditures for 
compensationj provided, however, that where the employer 
has failed to join. 1:n said action and to be represented therein 
by his own attorney, or where the employer has not made 
arrangernents with the employee's attorney to represent him 
in said action, the court shall fix a reasonable attorney's fee, 
which shall be fixed as a share of the amwunt actually received 
by the employe-r, to be paid to the employee's attorney on 
account of the services rende1·ed by him in effecting recovery 
for the benefit of the employer, which said fee shall be de-
ducted from any amounts due to the employer." 
•-A clause was added to section 3854 to specify that the attorney's fees 
allowed an employer who prosecutes an independent action shall be based 
"solely upon the services rendered by the employe1·'s attorney in effect-
ing recovery for the benefit of the employee.'' 
Section 3863 provides: "No provision of this chapter shall be deemed 
to impair the right of the employee and his attorney to contract as 
between themselves for attorney's fees to be paid by the employee for 
prosecuting any action or claim against any person other than the 
employer." 
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[1] .As the employer points out, the purpose of these 
amendments was to correct the statutory inequity which al-
lowed an employer reimbursement for attorney's fees ex-
pended in the prosecution of an independent action although 
the full amount of a judgment in favor of an employee, under 
converse circumstances, be allowed as a credit against 
compensation. [2] But when the liability has 
been settled, either the there 
is no provision for reimbursement to either of them for his 
legal expenses. A deduction for that expense is allowed by 
section 3861 only ''pursuant to the provisions of section 3856 
of this code.'' Section 3856 applies to a situation in 
which a lien is sought against a where the em-
ployer ''has failed to join in said action'' or has not arranged 
with the employee's attorney "to represent him in said ac-
tion," in which case "the court shall fix a reasonable attor-
ney's fee." It is clear from these provisions that a judicial 
proceeding is contemplated. 
[3] On the other hand, section 3860, which deals with 
settlements before judgment or without suit, is unaffected by 
the statutory change. It continues to provide that "[t]he 
entire amount of such settlement, or of any settlement without 
suit, is subject to the employer's full claim for reimbursement 
for his compensation and liability.'' 
The commission construes the amendments discussed as re-
pealing section 3860 by implication, and in its order accom-
panying its decision upon states that a lack of an 
express provision for that purpose "would appear to be due 
to a failure to correlate and to amend all the applicable sec-
tions.'' The amendments show no legislative intention to 
alter the reimbursement provisions relating to settlements,. 
and there is nothing in them to warrant a conclusion that a 
failure to amend the applicable sections was. due to a legis-
lative oversight. 
Several policy arguments have been advanced. The 
commission insists that a construction of the amendments 
denying to it the power to fix a reasonable attorney's fee 
for effecting a settlement and to deduct that amount from 
the employer's credit against an award will tend to discourage 
settlements, a result which the law disfavors. The petitioners 
assert that such a construction will compel the employer and 
employee to work harmoniously in prosecuting the claim, 
whereas a contrary reading of the statute would invite the 
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employee to effect an independent settlement contrary to the 
best interests of the employer. 
[ 4] There is a clear distinction between a suit to enforce 
the employee's cause of action against a third party, and a 
settlement which is made by the employee. The employee 
or employer vvho commences an action ''shall forthwith give 
to the other written notice of the action, and of the name 
of the court in which the action is brought .... " (Lab. 
Code, § 3853.) In that manner, each of them is afforded an 
opportunity to exert some control over the prosecution of 
the action if he believes it to be desirable. The parties may 
make arrangements for the payment of attorney's fees; 
if they do not do so, or if they refuse to cooperate in bringing 
the action, a reasonable attorney's fee for each may be fixed 
by the court. (Lab. Code, § 3856.) 
But the Legislature has not made provision for either 
notice to the other party when a settlement is contemplated 
or for the determination of the amount of an attorney's fee 
when it is effected. The employee's purpose is to recover an 
amount in addition to his compensation award; the employer 
is interested primarily in the recovery below that amount. 
\Vhen the chances of recovery are most favorable, the amount 
of the settlement obtained generally will be larger and the 
expense of an attorney's fee less. Ordinarily the employee 
will have greater incentive to press for a favorable recovery. 
But when the claim is doubtful, the converse situation is 
presented. And there may be little incentive for the em-
ployee to press a claim whose proceeds would inure only to 
the benefit of the employer. 
In short, to extend the provisions for recoupment of 
.attorney's fees beyond their application to a judicial action 
would be to do so without the safeguards applicable to them. 
The clear and literal construction of the new amendments 
does not support such an extension, and, as stated in Dodds 
v. Stellar, supra, "[i] f there is to be any change in these 
statutory provisions defining the rights of the parties, the 
suggestion for such change should be addressed to the Legis-
lature rather than to the courts." (30 Cal.2d at 506.) 
Other contentions are based upon the assumption that a 
deduction for attorney's fees may be allowed from a settle-
ment and require no discussion. 
That portion of the award which gives to California Com-
pensation Insurance Company a credit of only $1,400 is an-
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nulled with directions to the commission to allow a credit of 
$2,100; in all other respects the award is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Bray, 
J. protem.,* concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority holding here is subject to all the objections 
pointed out in my dissent in Dodds v. Stellar, 30 Cal.2d 496 
[183 P.2d 658]. (See discussion 21 So.Cal.L.Rev. 298.) 
After the decision of this court in the Dodds case the J)egis-
lature amended the Workmen's Compensation Act for the 
obvious purpose of rectifying the manifest inequities per-
mitted by the Dodds case. Yet the majority here holds that 
the amendments do not embrace a case where, as here, a 
settlement of the claim against the tort feasor has been 
consummated without suit, because the Legislature did not 
amend section 3860 of the Labor Code which provides that 
a settlement with or without suit is subject to the employer's 
claim for the compensation paid by him. Manifestly that can 
refer only to such portion of the settlement as remains after 
the attorney's fee, for obtaining the settlement, has been paid. 
It is obvious that the provision authorizing the payment of 
attorney's fees is clearly applicable to a settlement consum-
mated by the employee. (Lab. Code, § 3861, as amended 
Stats. 1949, ch. 120.) 'l'hat section authorizes the crediting 
to the employee of his attorney's fees whether the recovery is 
by settlement or judgment. It refers to the application of 
the settlement to the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to 
section 3856, and the latter section speaks of attorney's fees 
where there is a recovery in an action, but inasmuch as section 
3861 includes a settlement without action, the words in section 
3856, in referring to settlement after action, are not words 
of limitation to that situation. If they are, the language in 
section 3861 is rendered meaningless. 
The effect of the majority holding is to make settlements 
with the tort feasor an impossibility. The employee will not 
want to settle, at least until after he has commenced an action, 
because he will lose his attorney's fees. The employer will 
not wish to settle for the same reason. I am assuming, and 
it seems that the majority opinion holds, that the employer 
may not deduct attorney's fees in case of a settlement by 
''Assig-nc>d hy Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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him. If settlements before action are to be completely dis-
either around his to get 
un''""'"'s fees first action and then settling. 
It is hard to believe the intended such an absurd 
situation to exist. reasonable construction would allow 
the deduction of 's fees either employer or em-
ployee whether the settlement is made before or after the 
commencement of an action against the tort feasor. 
The majority seems to think that unfairness will result 
where there is a settlement by either one or the other and 
hence the rule favoring compromise is not applicable. This 
is based on the premise, assumed by the majority, that either 
the employer or employee may lawfully consummate a settle-
ment without consent of the other. The statute provides 
otherwise. (Lab. Code, §§ 3853, 3859, 3860.) The statute 
was held inapplicable as between the employee and the tort 
feasor ( Oilibrasi v. Reiter, 103 Cal.App.2d 397 [229 P.2d 
394]) but of course it still applies as between the employer 
and the employee. Here the employer is not objecting to 
the settlement consummated by the employee with the tort 
feasor. He, in effect, has approved the settlement as he is 
seeking to benefit thereby. It is obvious that if the settlement 
had been consummated without his consent, he would not 
be bound by it and could sue the tort feasor to recover all 
sums which he had expended on behalf of the employee for 
compensation and medical and hospital treatment as a result 
of the injury suffered by the employee for which the tort 
feasor is liable. Vv e then have this anomalous situation. An 
employee who has suffered an injury in the course of his 
employment as the result of the negligence of a third party, 
employs an attorney to handle his claim for damages against 
such third party. The attorney is able to consummate a 
settlement of the employee's claim which is satisfactory to 
both the employee and the employer, but after the settlement 
is consummated, the employer claims the entire amount of 
the settlement and refuses to allow any compensation to the 
attorney whose services were responsible for consummating 
the settlement and obtaining the money which appears to 
have been obtained solely for the benefit of the employer. 
As pointed out above, if the employer had not consented 
to the settlement, he would not be bound by it and could sue 
the tort feasor for the amount of any claim he may have. 
It seems to me that under any consideration of fairness and 
justice, as well as a reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
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provisions applicable to such a situation, it requires that the 
reasonable value of the services of the employee's attorney 
in obtaining the settlement should be paid before the em-
ployer's claim is satisfied in whole or in part. 
Assuming the majority opinion is correct in stating, "when 
the third party's liability has been settled, either by the 
employee or the employer, there is no provision for reim-
bursement to either of them for his legal expense,'' we then 
have a situation in which the statutes do not cover the subject 
of attorney's fees where there is a settlement, and, therefore, 
we must turn to the " ... well-established doctrine of equity 
jurisprudence that where a common fund exists to which a 
number of persons are entitled and in their interest successful 
litigation is maintained for its preservation and protection, 
an allowance of counsel fees may properly be made from such 
fund. By this means all of the beneficiaries of the fund pay 
their share of the expense necessary to make it available 
to them. (14 Am.Jur., § 74, p. 47; Trustees of Int. Imp. 
Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 [26 L.Ed. 1157] ; Estate 
of Marre, 18 Cal.2d 191 [114 P.2d 591] ; see, also, notes 49 
A.L.R.1149; 107 A.L.R. 749].)" (Winslow v. Harold G. 
Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal.2d 274, 277 [153 P.2d 714} .) And 
at page 283: "[The} long prevailing rule in equity ... 
allows such charge as a proper means of securing contribution 
from those entitled to participate in the benefits of the liti-
gation. And such counsel fees are customarily made senior 
to other claims against the fund. (Scott v. Superio1· Court, 
208 Cal. 303 [281 P. 55].) ... Where a lawyer has rendered 
such valuable service as to make available a fund for a class, 
even though he appeared for only one claimant, it is equitable 
that his compensation and expenses should come from the 
entire fund saved for all classes concerned before it is dis-
tributed. (Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161 [59 
S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184].) Counsel's right to compensation 
under such circumstances arises from the benefit conferred 
upon those who would have suffered loss but for his timely 
intervention, and not by reason of an agreement to pay his 
fees .... As is stated in Estate of Marre, 18 Cal.2d 191, 
192 [114 P.2d 591] : 'Plaintiffs who have succeeded in pro-
tecting, preserving or increasing a fund for the benefit of 
themselves and others may be awarded compensation from 
the fund for the services of their attorneys.' This principle 
is derived from the equitable concept that where one of a 
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group has borne the cost of litigation resulting in benefit to 
the entire group, the latter should contribute to such expenses. 
(Nolte v. Jhtdson Nav. Co., 47 F.2d 166; O'Hara v. Oak-
land County, 136 F.2d 152] .) 
"Not only is it established that the litigant is entitled to 
be compensated for the expense he has incurred in the prose-
cution of such an action, but there is created in favor of the 
attorney who renders the service an equitable lien against 
the fund so preserved. (Central Railroad & Bkg. Co. v. 
Petttts, 113 U.S. 116 [5 S.Ct. 387, 28 L.Ed. 915]; Colley v. 
Wolcott, 187 F. 595 [109 O.C.A. 425]; Muskegon Boiler 
Works v. Tennessee Valley I. & R. Co., 274 F. 836.) 
''These equitable considerations sustain appellant's position 
as to the priority of his claim against the trust fund. . . . 
Nor on equitable considerations should the claim of the federal 
government for income taxes accrued before the commence-
ment of this action stand on a distinguishable level in rela-
tion to appellant's allowance for counsel fees for preservation 
of the fund. The latter, viewed as an expense of judicial 
administration in making the trust assets available for dis-
tribution to claimants, should properly take priority." (Em-
phasis added; Winslow v. Harold G. Ferg7tson Corp., supra; 
see, also, :Restatement, Restitution, § 105.) 
I can see no reason why the rule announced in the authori-
ties above cited should not be applicable to a situation such 
as that presented in the case at bar. Certainly all of the 
elements necessary to bring such rule into operation are 
present here and I can see no reason why it should not be 
invoked in the interests of justice. 
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the award. 
